By: Dr. Zafar
Nawaz Jaspal
The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit was held in
Washington D.C. on March 31 and April 1, 2016. Nuclear Security Summit 2016
Communiqué stated: “The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism remains
one of the greatest challenges to international security, and the threat is
constantly evolving.” More than 50 world leaders participated in the Summit.
They expressed their commitment to advance a central pillar of President Barack
Obama’s Prague Agenda, i.e. “preventing terrorists from obtaining and using a
nuclear weapon.” The participants in the Summit ensured to the international
community to safeguard nuclear and radiological materials from ending up in the
hands of terrorists. Indeed, it is a sign of relief in the age of asymmetrical
warfare.
Although the issues discussed in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) were broad
based and not country specific, yet Pakistan received proportionately greater
attention in the international media. The encouraging fact is that many
international organizations, including International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), reputed American think tanks, in their published reports during the
preceding weeks of 2016 NSS acknowledged the practical efforts of Pakistan to
ensure the safety and security of its nuclear material and facilities. In
addition, the 2016 NSS provided an opportunity to Islamabad to highlight its
creditable nuclear material and facility safety and security record and demand
for the end of the discriminatory Nuclear Supplier Group restraints on nuclear
equipment and technology transfers to Pakistan. Syed Tariq Fatemi, Special
Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs categorically
stated in the Nuclear Security Summit: “Pakistan has strong credentials to
become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export
control regimes, on non-discriminatory basis.” It is because, it maintains a
safe, secure and effective nuclear program.
The NSS process resulted in the establishment of a nuclear security regime,
i.e. patchwork of many treaty commitments, bilateral and multilateral
initiatives, and informal rules. The following discussion is an attempt to
answer the two interlinked questions. Has NSS process succeeded in constituting
a reliable nuclear security regime? What is Pakistan’s approach towards the NSS
process?
Significance of Nuclear Security Summit Process
Today, nuclear and radiological terrorism is not a theoretical risk. That the
terrorist groups may cause nuclear havoc is a realistic threat. During the last
week of March 2016, Belgium media reported alarming news that: “Two of the
Brussels suicide bombers secretly filmed the daily routine of the head of
Belgium’s nuclear research and development program and considered an attack on
a nuclear site in the country.” On March 30, 2016, President Barack Obama wrote
in an opinion piece in The Washington Post: “Of all the threats to global
security and peace, the most dangerous is the proliferation and potential use
of nuclear weapons. That’s why, seven years ago in Prague, I committed the
United States to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and to seeking a world
without them.” He added: “Given the continued threat posed by organizations
such as the terrorist group we call ISIL, or ISIS, we’ll also join allies and
partners in reviewing our counterterrorism efforts, to prevent the world’s most
dangerous networks from obtaining the world’s most dangerous weapons.” On April
5, 2009 in a speech at Prague, President Obama while describing nuclear
terrorism as “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security,”
promised to initiate “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable
nuclear material around the world within four years.” In the following year he
launched the NSS process.
President Obama’s commitment for the safety and security of nuclear
infrastructure and material resulted in the process of nuclear security
summits. The NSS provided a forum for high-level meetings during which heads of
state/government deliberated for the implementation of restrictions to secure
nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear facilities. Precisely, the
primary objective of the NSS was to improve nuclear security that prevents
terrorists from sabotaging nuclear facility as well as prevent them from making
and detonating a nuclear weapon/dirty bomb.
President Obama convened the first NSS in Washington, D.C., on April 12 and 13,
2010, to discuss how better to safeguard weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to
prevent nuclear/radiological terrorism. It was reported that: “in the run-up to
the 2010 summit, Obama’s team asked summit participants – like dinner party
guests – to each bring a “house gift” when they showed up. Instead of bottles
of wine or bouquets of flowers, these house gifts were pledges to take concrete
action on nuclear security, such as removing HEU or signing on to one of the
conventions. While many participants opted to effectively “re-gift” commitments
they had already planned to make, others took significant new steps, and almost
all fulfilled their pledges.” The second summit held in Seoul, in March 2012
had further strengthened the gift approach by announcing a series of “gift
baskets,” or joint commitments by several states, to goals that included
preventing nuclear smuggling and improving control of nuclear information. The
third NSS held in the Hague in 2014 received a more serious response, i.e. “Two
thirds of participants signed the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation
Initiative. Under it, states agreed to treat IAEA guidelines as minimum
standards for domestic law, and to request peer reviews of their nuclear
security rules, providing a mechanism by which states could better assure the
public and the international community that they were sufficiently protecting
materials and facilities.” (The Atomic Science Bulletin, March 2016) The
commencement of nuclear security summit had invigorated a serious discourse on
the subject of nuclear terrorism. The tangible outcome of the process is that
more than a dozen countries were cleared of HEU and signed on to the key
international conventions.
The 2016 NSS had experienced constructive as well as distrustful happenings. It
included a special session on responding to urban terrorist attacks — and a
simulation of how to handle the threat of imminent nuclear terrorism. It
created an action plan for nuclear security under the auspices of five
international organizations: the IAEA, the United Nations, Interpol, the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In this context, the
primary role was assigned to IAEA. According to the Nuclear Security Summit
2016 Communiqué: “We reaffirm the essential responsibility and the central role
of the International Atomic Energy Agency in strengthening the global nuclear
security architecture and in developing international guidance, and its leading
role in facilitating and coordinating nuclear security activities among
international organizations and initiatives and supporting the efforts of
states to fulfill their nuclear security responsibilities. We welcome and
support the Agency in convening regular high-level international conferences,
such as the December 2016 international conference on nuclear security
including its ministerial segment, to maintain political momentum and continue
to raise awareness of nuclear security among all stakeholders.” Notwithstanding
these optimistic conclusions, the pessimistic fact was that the Russian
Federation, where some of the largest stockpiles of civilian nuclear material
and second largest nuclear arsenal in the world remain, had chosen to boycott
the 2016 NSS.
Importantly, the fourth and final NSS brought the process to an end on April 1,
2016. Despite the conclusion of the NSS process, the issue remains debatable,
whether all high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and facilities are
rigorously protected from theft or sabotage. “The Nuclear Security Summits have
had a positive effect, but the strategic goal of developing an effective global
nuclear security system remains unachieved,” the Nuclear Threat Initiative, an
anti-proliferation watchdog, claimed on March 23, 2016. Perhaps, the four
Nuclear Security Summits did not end completely the threat of nuclear and
radiological terrorism. Tons of materials that terrorists could use to make
dirty bombs even today remain deeply vulnerable to theft. Conversely, the
encouraging concrete accomplishment is that these summits have created a
realization of the threat at the highest level, which entailed various
measures/initiative to prevent the misuse of nuclear material by the terrorist
organizations. The nations with nuclear wherewithal have identified many areas
in which cooperation and better security could help further diminish nuclear
and radiological threats through the participation in NSS process. Precisely,
“The Summits have also strengthened the nuclear security architecture at
national, regional and global levels, including through broadened ratification
and implementation of international legal instruments regarding nuclear
security.
Pakistan’s Cognizance to
Nuclear Safety and Security
Since 1960s, Pakistan has been endeavoring to utilize nuclear energy for its
economic prosperity. Accordingly, today, it is included among a few
technologically advanced countries that have been successfully using nuclear
energy for power generation, boosting agriculture products – wheat, cotton,
etc. – yield and in medical center for curing cancer patients. In addition,
Pakistan is also employing nuclear technology for solidifying its defensive
fence. Despite serious opposition by international community and destabilizing
economic sanctions by United States-led Western nations; Pakistan has been
maintaining its advanced nuclear program.
Pakistan’s advanced nuclear program necessities the establishment of a robust
safety and security apparatus to prevent the nuclear and radiological
terrorism. It has not only indigenously institutionalized safety and security
system but also has continuously been upgrading it with the assistance of
neutral international institutions. Today, its export controls are consistent
with those being implemented by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology
Control Regime, and the Australia Group. Moreover, the international community
has acclaimed its Export Control Act of 2004.
Islamabad regularly participates in the international forums to cooperate with
the international community to impede the threat of nuclear and radiological
terrorism. Consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear installations are very much secure.
It was reported that the IAEA has recorded 2,734 nuclear incidents worldwide,
including five in India, but “not a single accident or breach happened in Pakistan.”
Similarly, the Harvard Kennedy School Report released on March 21, 2016,
revealed that: “US officials have reportedly ranked Indian nuclear security
measures as weaker than those of Pakistan and Russia.” The report concluded
that Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements were stronger than India’s.
Pakistan assigned great importance to the safety and security of nuclear
materials, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons. Recently, therefore, it
ratified an important nuclear security accord – a 2005 amendment to the
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). It requires
states party to provide appropriate physical protection of nuclear materials on
their own territory. Islamabad had participated in the four Nuclear Security
Summits with a sense of objectivity. During the previous three NSS, the Prime
Ministers led its delegations. Premier Nawaz Sharif announced to lead Pakistani
delegation to participate in the fourth NSS. Unfortunately, due to terrorist
attacks in Lahore on March 27, 2016, he cancelled his planned visit to the
United States to attend the NSS. Consequently, Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, led the delegation to the fourth NSS.
Pakistan’s engagement with the NSS process was guided by four key principles:
first, the NSS should not lead to new or parallel mechanisms; rather, it should
help strengthen the existing arrangements. Second, the NSS should not put any
additional obligations on the participating countries. Third, the NSS should maintain
focus on the civil-nuclear fuel cycle, without venturing into weapons programs,
which remain the sovereign prerogative of all nuclear weapon states. Fourth,
NSS-related commitments, as agreed by participating states in the form of
communiques and other outcome documents, would remain voluntary in nature and
be guided by the states’ domestic and international obligations.
Conclusion
The critical examination of NSS process reveals the truth that Global Zero
movement for the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the
earth is not a realistic objective in the prevalent anarchical international
society. Conversely, the safety and security of nuclear material, nuclear
facilities and nuclear weapons is not only imperative for global security but
also a realistic agenda. Therefore, the primary objective of NSS process should
not be allowed to degenerate after President Obama leaves office in January
2017.
The international security is a shared responsibility and thereby the global
consensus is imperative for an effective enforceable system for securing
nuclear materials to protect the world from dangers of nuclear and radiological
terrorism. The participants rightly pronounced in Nuclear Security Summit 2016
Communiqué: “Countering nuclear and radiological terrorism demands
international cooperation, including sharing of information in accordance with
States’ national laws and procedures. International cooperation can contribute
to a more inclusive, coordinated, sustainable, and robust global nuclear
security architecture for the common benefit and security of all.” Hence,
instead of ‘discriminatory approach’ in the nuclear realm, ‘universal approach’
shall be adopted in engaging the sovereign nations to ensure the safety and
security of nuclear material and facilities.